

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NIC-01 AID-05 IO-10 SAM-01

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R 260830Z FEB 75

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3287

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUANDA 0218

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS MILI AO

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF CHIPENDA'S MILITARY UNION WITH FNLA

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

1. SUMMARY. CHIPENDA'S DECISION TO PLACE HIS FORCES UNDER THE OVER-ALL COMMAND OF FNLA INCREASES THE SCOPE AND QUALITY OF FNLA'S MILITARY POWER, ELIMINATES ONE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF CIVIL WAR AND OFFERS FNLA A LIMITED CHANCE TO INCREASE ITS POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE SOUTH. MPLA ACCEPTS THE ADHERENCE OF CHIPENDA TO FNLA BUT STATES THAT SOME OF CHIPENDA'S COMMANDERS HAVE DEFECTED TO MPLA. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S THESIS (LUANDA 0182) THAT CHIPENDA'S ASSOCIATION WITH FNLA WILL MEAN CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA. END SUMMARY.

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY DANIEL CHIPENDA, HEAD OF THE EASTERN REVOLT FACTION OF MPLA, ON FEBRUARY 21 THAT HE WAS INTEGRATING HIS  
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MILITARY FORCES INTO FNLA (NATIONAL ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION

OF ANGOLA, THE MILITARY BRANCH OF FNLA) GOES FAR TOWARDS ELIMINATING A MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN ANGOLA. ALL THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAD STATED PUBLICLY THAT CHIPENDA'S INDEPENDENT STATUS COULD BE THE CAUSE OF A CIVIL WAR AND FNLA AND UNITA RECENTLY CALLED ON CHIPENDA TO JOIN ONE OF THE MOVEMENTS. UNITA HAS NOT YET MADE ANY COMMENT ON CHIPENDA'S MOVE BUT THE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA, MPLA'S MILITARY ARM) ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON FEBRUARY 22 TACITLY ACCEPTING THE ADHERENCE OF "THAT WELL KNOWN AGENT OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM" TO FNLA. THERE WAS A LOT OF SOUR GRAPES IN THE FAPLA COMMUNIQUE BUT THE IMPRESSION IT CONVEYED WAS THAT MPLA WILL NOT CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF CHIPENDA'S ACTIONS.

3. CHIPENDA'S OWN STATUS IS STILL UNCLEAR. HE DID NOT DISSOLVE HIS EASTERN REVOLT FACTION, LEAVE MPLA OR STATE THAT HE HIMSELF WAS JOINING FNLA. HE MERELY PLACED HIS FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF ELNA. NEVERTHELESS, FNLA, IN A FEBRUARY 22 COMMUNIQUE, WELCOMED THE "MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF DANIEL CHIPENDA INTO FNLA." AS A PRACTICAL MATTER CHIPENDA WOULD HAVE TO OPENLY JOIN FNLA BEFORE HE AND HIS PEOPLE COULD HAVE A ROLE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS, BECAUSE ONLY MEMBERS OF THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS CAN BECOME CANDIDATES FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. BY REMAINING PERSONALLY OUTSIDE OF FNLA, HOWEVER, HE LEAVES OPEN THE CHANCE, HOWEVER REMOTE, OF RETURNING TO MPLA IF NETO WERE TO LEAVE THE SCENE OR LOSE POWER.

4. FNLA SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVES ITS MILITARY POSTURE BY THE INCORPORATION OF THE CHIPENDA FORCES. THE TROOPS IT PICKS UP, 2,000 TO 3,000 WELL-TRAINED COMBAT VETERANS OF MPLA'S EASTERN CAMPAIGN, WERE LONG RESPECTED BY THE PORTUGUESE ARMY AS AGGRESSIVE, ABLE SOLDIERS. THEY ARE LOCATED WHOLLY IN EASTERN ANGOLA, FROM LUSO ALONG THE MAIN ROAD LEADING TO THE CAPRIVI STRIP AND THUS ARE AT THE REAR OF UNITA, WITHIN A STRIKING DISTANCE OF UNITA'S MAIN TRAINING BASES SOUTHWEST OF LUSO. THEY EXTEND FNLA'S MILITARY INFLUENCE INTO A REGION WHERE IT HAS NEVER BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND ALLOWS FNLA TO PUT SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PRESSURE ON MPLA AND UNITA IN THE ENTIRE EASTERN REGION, SHOULD IT SO DESIRE.

5. WE LEARNED IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS FROM KINSHASA, AS WELL AS FROM ZAIRE'S VICE CONSUL IN ANGOLA, THAT  
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HOLDEN ROBERTO BELIEVES HE CAN WIN THE UPCOMING ELEKTIONS AND COUNTS HEAVILY ON CHIPENDA AS HIS VEHICLE FOR WINNING SOUTHERN VOTES. CHIPENDA IS WELL KNOWN IN THE SOUTH AND IS FROM THE SAME ETHNO-LINGUISTIC GROUP AS SAVIMBI, THE OVIMBUNDU-UMBUNDU. BOTH MEN HAVE A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE DONDI EVANGELICAL MISSION IN BELA VISTA. CHIPENDA'S FATHER WAS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES OF CENTRAL ANGOLA (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST AND THE UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA) AND HIS WIDOWED MOTHER STILL LIVES

ON THE GROUNDS. SAVIMBI'S FATHER WAS A LAY CATECHIST FOR THE CHURCH AND SAVIMBI HIMSELF ATTENDED SCHOOL THERE. I VISITED THE MISSION LAST OCTOBER AND THE REGION OVER WHICH IT EXERCISES INFLUENCE AND OBSERVED THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHOSE LIVES ARE TOUCHED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY DONDI AND ITS SATELLITE MISSIONS RUNS INTO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS. I AM SURE THAT IF TRIED HE COULD GET SOME SUPPORT AS A RESULT OF HIS FATHER'S POSITION AND SUBSEQUENT DEATH IN SAO NICOLAU PRISON AFTER BEING JAILED BY THE PORTUGUESE, BUT SAVIMBI HAS ALREADY CAPTURED THE IMAGINATION OF THE UMBUNDU SPEAKERS OF CENTRAL ANGOLA, WHEREAS CHIPENDA HAS YET TO SHOW THAT HE CAN TRANSLATE PUBLIC RECOGNITION INTO POPULAR SUPPORT. UNITA HAS BEEN ORGANIZING FURIOUSLY IN THE POPULOUS AREA AROUND NOVA LISBOA SINCE MAY AND ALL INDICATIONS WE HAVE ARE THAT EXCEPT FOR SOME EDUCATED URBAN BLACKS, ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG, THE PEOPLE THERE ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND SAVIMBI. CHIPENDA/FNLA WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS, UPHILL FIGHT TO WIN ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN THAT REGION, ESPECIALLY AS CHIPENDA CANNOT READILY MOVE HIS MILITARY FORCES THERE. WE DO AGREE THAT BY RIDING ON CHIPENDA'S COATTAILS ROBERTO HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF WINNING VOTES IN THE CENTER AND SOUTH THAN IF HE WERE CAMPAIGNING ALONE.

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FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUANDA 0218

7. THE SAGA OF CHIPENDA IS NOT YET FINISHED. MPLA ANNOUNCED ON FEBRUARY 23 THAT SOME OF CHIPENDA'S "PROGRESSIVE" COMMANDERS HAVE COME OVER TO MPLA. NO MENTION IS MADE OF THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, IF ANY, THESE DEFECTORS BROUGHT WITH THEM. EVEN THOUGH CHIPENDA IS WRAPPED IN THE MANTLE OF FNLA THE LEADERSHIP OF MPLA STILL FEAR HIM AND WILL TRY THEIR UTMOST TO DISCREDIT HIM. HE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A FAVORITE MPLA WHIPPING BOY. ATTACKING HIM, VERBALLY OR OTHERWISE, MPLA MUST NOW ALSO ATTACK FNLA. ELNA SAID IN A COMMUNIQUE ON FEBRUARY 24 THAT THEY CONSIDER ANY DENUNCIATION OF CHIPENDA TO BE A DENUNCIATION OF FNLA AND QUESTION WHETHER BY ATTACKING CHIPENDA MPLA MEANS TO DENOUNCE THE MOBASA ACCORD THAT CALLS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LIBERATION GROUPS.

8. I DO NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH HIGH COMMISSIONER' CARDOSO'S CONTENTION THAT THE UNIFICATION OF FNLA AND THE CHIPENDA FORCES WILL MEAN CIVIL WAR. CARDOSO TOLD US THEAT ROBERTO WILL NOW FEEL SO EMBOLDENED THAT HE NO LONGER WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO NEGOTIATE  
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AND COMPROMISE WITH THE MPLA. CARDOSO SEES THE DAILY FRICTIONS BETWEEN MPLA AND FNLA AND HE HEARS FNLA SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE PUSHED AROUND BY A BUNCH OF COMMIES WHO ARE TRYING TO DESTROY THE COUNTRY.

9. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT EVEN THOUGH ROBERTO MUST NOW FEEL MILITARILY STRENGTHENED, HE MUST ALSO HAVE A GREATER SENSE OF CONFIDENCE THAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION IS ALSO IMPROVED AND FOR THAT REASON HE CAN AFFORD TO PLAY THE POLITICAL GAME. HE MUST SEE THAT MPLA IS FAST LOSING FAVOR WITH THE PUBLIC AND THAT EVEN IN LUANDA THERE NOW EXIST DOUBTS ABOUT MPLA'S ELECTORAL STRENGTH. THE UNITA MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES TOLD ME ON FEBRUARY 25 THAT UNITA EXPECTS TO WIN IN LUANDA. I SUPPOSE THAT IF YOU COULD PUT TOGETHER A COALITION HERE OF WHITES AND THE SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY OF BLACKS FROM THE SOUTH YOU PROBABLY WOULD HAVE CLOSE TO A MAJORITY. IF FNLA CAN KEEP ITS COOL IT, TOO, STANDS TO PICK UP A GOOD MANY VOTES.  
KILLORAN

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